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Abstract: A common justification that economists have historically given for why competition 
authorities should generally tolerate vertical mergers is the successive monopoly model, in which a 
vertical merger results in a price reduction by eliminating double marginalization (EDM). That model 
does not include any rivals to one of the merging firms, so it assumes away both the possibility that 
a vertical merger can result in raising rivals’ costs (RRC) and or vertical upward pricing pressure. I 
extend the successive/complementary model to allow for differentiated duopoly in the sale of the 
final good. This structure is one of the two simplest possible settings to allow for EDM, RRC, and 
vertical upward pricing pressure (the other being duopoly upstream and monopoly downstream). 
Since this market structure leaves the competing downstream firm with no independent source of 
supply, it would seem to be the one most likely to give rise to anticompetitive pricing incentives. The 
model reveals, however, an additional competitive effect. Eliminating double marginalization not 
only removes a pricing distortion for the merging firm, but it can also increase competitive pressure 
on the rival and its input supplier (even if the merging firm is the input supplier). I consider a variety 
of functional forms for demand and allow for the stages to be either successive or complementary. 
RRC and an increase in one of the two consumer prices occurs in some cases, but the price the 
merged firm charges its downstream competitor does not increase (and, indeed, drops) in a 
surprisingly broad set of cases. The results suggest that any prediction of a price increase due to a 
vertical merger based on static pricing incentives will be sensitive to assumptions about the 
functional form of demand and the timing of decisions that may be hard to verify.   
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I. Introduction 
How vertical mergers affect competition is a long-standing issue in antitrust enforcement. 
Through the 1960’s, U.S. antitrust enforcement viewed vertical mergers as posing nearly as great a 
threat to competition as horizontal mergers. If a shoe manufacturer and a chain of shoe stores merged, 
the combined firm could decline to sell its shoes to competing stores (thus foreclosing those stores from 
a desired input) or refuse to carry the shoes of competing manufacturers, thus foreclosing them of a 
distribution outlet.1 The first US merger guidelines, which the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued in 
1968, laid out structural criteria that would likely give rise to merger challenges [U.S. Department of 
Justice (1968), “1968 Merger Guidelines”]. Those structural criteria were nearly as restrictive as those 
for challenging horizontal mergers. 
In the 1970’s, scholars started questioning various elements of antitrust policy, including policy 
toward vertical mergers; and these trends in the academic literature affected a major policy shift when 
Ronald Reagan became President in 1981. An essential feature of this shift was an increased role for 
economics in antitrust enforcement. In 1982, the DOJ issued merger guidelines that laid out some 
conditions that could give rise to vertical merger challenges but which also stated that vertical mergers 
generally pose less of a threat to competition than do horizontal mergers [U.S. Department of Justice 
(1982), “1982 Merger Guidelines”]. Merger enforcement in the U.S. since 1982 has largely reflected the 
perspective of the 1982 DOJ merger guidelines. This enforcement philosophy has not been not limited 
to the U.S. The introduction to the non-horizontal merger guidelines that the European Commission 
issued in 2007 states, “Non-horizontal mergers are generally less likely to significantly impede effective 
competition than horizontal mergers.”2  
 
1 This was the factual setting in Brown Shoe v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294 (1962).  




The distinction that has been drawn in antitrust enforcement between horizontal and vertical 
mergers might seem to reflect an important contribution of sound economic reasoning to public policy. 
Recently, however, some economists have challenged this benign view of vertical mergers and the 
policies based on it. In 2020, the DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued new Vertical 
Merger Guidelines, the first US merger guidelines to address vertical mergers since the DOJ’s 1984 
Merger Guidelines [U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Federal Trade Commission (2020) “USVMG”].3 
Prior to issuing the USVMG, the DOJ and FTC solicited public comments on a set of draft vertical merger 
guidelines. The comments revealed a sharp divide among economists with some arguing that policy 
toward vertical mergers should continue to reflect a presumption that vertical mergers pose less of a 
threat to competition than horizontal mergers,4 some stressing the potential anticompetitive harm from 
vertical mergers,5 and some going so far as to argue that vertical mergers in concentrated industries are 
as problematic as horizontal mergers in similar industries. In particular, Baker, et al. (2020) question the 
view that “vertical mergers are somehow inherently less likely to harm competition than horizontal 
mergers…” and assert that economic theory provides no support for the proposition that vertical 
mergers in concentrated industries are less likely to be harmful to competition than horizontal mergers. 
Moresi and Salop question the proposition that “vertical mergers are inherently different from 
horizontal mergers because there is no elimination of competition.”6  
In this paper, I analyze the model of an upstream monopolist that sells an input to two 
competing, differentiated downstream firms and charges linear, profit-maximizing prices. This model 
has received some treatment in the literature,7 but it has not received the attention it deserves. Much of 
 
3 The section on vertical mergers in the 1984 Merger Guidelines are identical to those in the 1982 Merger 
Guidelines. 
4 See, for example, Werden and Froeb (2020), Sibley and Domnenko (2020), and Salinger (2020).  
5 See, for example, Economides, et al. (2020), Rogerson (2020), and Shapiro (2020). 
6 Moresi and Salop (2020), p. 1. Steve Salop has written extensively on this subject both individually and with a 
variety of co-authors. See, notably, Salop (2018) and the references therein.  




the theoretical literature on vertical mergers considers more complicated variants. Given these more 
“sophisticated” or, more accurately, complicated models, the simple setting below might seem to be a 
step backwards. But the results from this simple setting are crucial for assessing whether economics 
provides what John Sutton (1991) labeled “robust theory” to support challenging vertical mergers based 
on how they affect static pricing incentives. Horizontal merger enforcement relies heavily on static 
pricing incentives, and economics does provide robust theory in support of such policies.8 The DOJ and 
FTC (the “Agencies”) sometimes rely on models that are more complicated than standard oligopoly 
models to capture salient features of the markets at issue in particular mergers. For example, they use 
bargaining models in cases such as hospital mergers, where the bargaining between hospitals and 
managed care companies is a key feature of the competitive environment.9 Nevertheless, the standard 
oligopoly models taught in any undergraduate industrial economics course (and, for that matter, 
intermediate and even introductory microeconomics courses) capture the logic underlying horizontal 
merger enforcement. The Cournot model and, increasingly, the Bertrand model with differentiated 
products are the theoretical bedrock for those policies. If the results from extending those models to 
multiple stages of production predicted the same types of price effects from vertical mergers in 
concentrated markets as those models predict for horizontal mergers, those results would provide 
support for a less permissive policy toward vertical mergers. But, while extending standard oligopoly 
models to multiple stages implies that vertical mergers do not necessarily benefit consumers, it also 
implies that the effect of vertical mergers can be much different from the effect of horizontal mergers. 
In assessing what economic theory predicts about the competitive effects of vertical mergers, the results 
 
8 As I discuss in the conclusion, vertical mergers can be anticompetitive for reasons other than how they affect 
static pricing incentives. But the new USVMG stress the similarity between how the Agencies analyze vertical and 
horizontal mergers; and their review of horizontal mergers often focuses on how they affect static pricing 
incentives.   





from these simple extensions are not merely one set of models to consider. They should be the starting 
point. They should be what is in the textbooks, and they should play prominently in the advice 
economists give to policy makers.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II contains a brief review of the 
theoretical literature on the competitive effects of vertical mergers.10 It is not exhaustive. Instead, the 
focus is on explaining why the monopoly-duopoly model, while in many ways simpler than some of the 
models in the literature, fills a significant gap in the existing literature. Section III presents the model of 
vertical mergers assuming the upstream firm sets the price it charges each firm for the input and then 
downstream firms engage in Bertrand competition. Section IV modifies the model to treat the two 
stages as complementary rather than successive.  
Section V presents merger simulations for specific functional forms. It starts with the solutions 
to both models assuming linear demand. In the vertical stage model with symmetric cross-price effects, 
a vertical merger causes downstream prices and, remarkably, the price the merged firm charges for the 
input to the other downstream firm to drop. With asymmetric cross-price effects, a vertical merger 
between the upstream firm and one of the two downstream firms can cause the price of the 
intermediate good charged to the other downstream firm to increase and, with sufficiently large 
asymmetries in the cross-price effects, one of the downstream prices to increase as well. In such cases, a 
 
10 See Cooper, et al. (2005), Lafontaine and Slade (2007), Blair, et al. (2020), and Beck and Scott Morton (2020) for 
reviews and assessments of the empirical literature. Of these, the first three conclude that the weight of the 
evidence supports the view that vertical mergers benefit consumers. Beck and Scott-Morton question that 
conclusion. Because pre-merger review necessarily rests on imperfect predictions, rational policy based on 
decision theory requires prior probabilities (perhaps conditioned on observable factors) of whether vertical 
mergers are procompetitive. See Baker (2015). As Beck and Scott-Morton argue, however, the published literature 
is not a representative sample. Representative or not, the sample is very small. The effect of vertical mergers and 
integration is easier to study in some industries (multi-channel video distribution and soft drinks, to name two) 
than in others; and what scholars find interesting biases both what scholars study and what referees and editors 
accept. Thus, absent objective empirical probabilities, the prior probabilities that inform policy (either explicitly or 




vertical merger between the downstream monopolist and the other downstream firm results in a 
reduction in the price of the input and both final good prices.   
In the complementary stages model with symmetric cross-price effects, a vertical merger causes 
the sum of the component prices for both goods to drop, but the price of the intermediate good used in 
conjunction with the component produced by the other downstream firm to increase. As in the vertical 
stages model, with asymmetric cross-price effects, the sum of the component prices for one of the 
goods can increase.  
The last part of Section V explores the sensitivity of the results to the assumption of linear 
demand by presenting simulation results for three different functional forms. Two are variants of semi-
logarithmic demand and one is for logit demand. One of the semi-logarithmic demand functions is 
convex to the origin and one is concave. In both semi-log cases, a vertical merger causes a reduction in 
all prices for symmetric demand in both the successive stage and complementary stage variants of the 
model. For logit demand, a vertical merger causes an increase in the price of the intermediate good and 
the good sold by the remaining independent firm. 
Section VI contains concluding comments. When the DOJ issued its 1982 and 1984 Merger 
Guidelines, the theoretical basis for a permissive policy toward vertical mergers rested in large part on 
the successive monopoly model. That model is less compelling as a justification for permitting vertical 
mergers in concentrated industries than some would suggest because it cannot capture the effect of a 
vertical merger on remaining unintegrated rivals. Extending the successive monopoly model to a 
structure in which anticompetitive effects can occur does not, however, lead to a result that vertical 
mergers generally result in higher prices. Thus, economic theory does provide a foundation for believing 
that vertical mergers even in concentrated industries are less likely to create an incentive to raise prices 




mergers, challenges based on the same sort of static pricing incentives that provide the basis for many 
(indeed, most) challenges to horizontal mergers are problematic.  
II. Literature Review 
The so-called Chicago school critique of antitrust policy rested primarily on two models. One 
was of a monopolist at one stage selling to a competitive downstream stage. Given the additional 
assumption of fixed proportions in production,11 the monopolist has no incentive to integrate into the 
downstream stage because it can capture the same profits it could earn as a vertically integrated 
monopolist. This model is the basis for what is known as the “single monopoly profit theorem.”12 It is 
easy to overstate the implications of the theorem for merger enforcement.13 When the adjacent stage is 
imperfectly competitive, a monopolist at one stage does have an incentive to integrate into the 
downstream stage. The challenge for antitrust enforcement is then to assess whether the effect of 
integration is to raise prices or to lower them. 
The second model (or more accurately, pair of models) underlying the Chicago school view of 
vertical mergers is Cournot’s (1870)14 model of complementary monopoly and Spengler’s (1950) model 
 
11 In the 1970’s, a series of articles analyzed how the assumption of variable proportions in production altered the 
results. See Vernon and Graham (1971), Schmalensee (1973), Warren-Boulton (1974), Mallela and Nahata (1980), 
and Westfield (1981). Riordan (1998) presents a model of vertical mergers by a dominant downstream firm that 
competes with a competitive fringe both to purchase a necessary input in a competitive market and to sell output. 
The result is that such a merger causes a price increase. Riordan cites US Steel’s integration into iron ore at the 
beginning of the twentieth century as a possible application. Despite the assumption of perfect competition at the 
adjacent stage, the upward slope of the supply curve for the input and the presence of the competitive fringe 
violate the assumptions underlying the single monopoly profit theorem. 
12 Who deserves credit for first deriving this principle remains unclear. It was part of an oral tradition associated 
with Aaron Director at the University of Chicago. See McGee and Bassett (1976).  
13 See Elhauge (2009). The single monopoly profit theorem does provide some useful insights. For example, even 
Chicago school theorists acknowledge that vertical integration (either through merger or direct investment) in 
rate-regulated industries can be a strategy for circumventing price regulation. The basis for this conclusion is that 
the assumptions underlying the single monopoly profit theorem do not hold if the monopolist cannot set the price 
that maximizes its profits. While the single monopoly profit theorem may not be “dead” as the title of his article 
asserts, El-Hauge is correct that its applications are more limited than some would suggest.  





of successive monopoly. Both entail monopolists operating at different stages of production;15 and, both 
predict that a merger of the two monopolists provides an incentive to lower prices. The mechanism 
giving rise to the result is the “elimination of double marginalization” (EDM).  
This pair of ideas underlying the traditional Chicago school view do not, by themselves, justify a 
completely benign view of vertical mergers. One concern about how a vertical merger might harm 
competition is through raising rivals’ costs (“RRC”).16 Salop and Scheffman (1983, 1987) coined the term 
and presented a model that captures the effect. RRC is related but not identical to foreclosure. 
Foreclosure (or “complete foreclosure”) from a vertical merger occurs if the merged firm refuses to sell 
an input to (input foreclosure) or purchase output from (output foreclosure) firms with which it had 
transacted prior to the merger. RRC can result from foreclosure, but RRC can occur even if the vertically 
integrated firm continues to transact with rival firms; and the costs of competing firms can drop even if 
the merging firm engages in foreclosure.17 
The model of successive/complementary monopoly does not address this concern with vertical 
mergers because there are no rivals in the model to experience RRC. The natural extensions of the 
successive/complementary monopoly to take RRC into account would be to assume two stages of 
production with a standard oligopoly model at one or both stages. That is, assume successive Cournot 
oligopoly for homogeneous products or differentiated products with Bertrand competition at one of the 
stages with some form of market power (possibly monopoly) at the adjacent stage. The theoretical 
literature on the potential anticompetitive harm from vertical mergers that started to emerge in the 
 
15 The difference between the two concerns the timing of when the firms set prices. In the Cournot model, the 
firms set the prices of their respective stages (which might be thought of as a margin if one of the firms is thought 
of as being “downstream”). In the Spengler model, the upstream firm sets its price first. The model in Section IV is 
based on the Spengler timing while the model in Section V follows Cournot’s. 
16 When one firm sells an intermediate input to a firm that then sells to final consumers, the margin charged by the 
downstream firm can be thought of as a price of distribution paid by the upstream firm. An increase in that margin 
constitutes an increase in that price.  
17 In the Salinger (1988) model of successive Cournot oligopoly, a vertical merger can result in a reduction in the 





1980’s to address the shortcomings of Chicago School analysis does contain some such analysis,18 but 
many of the models went beyond or deviated in some important way from what might seem to be the 
obvious simple extensions.  
Hart and Tirole (1990) deviated from the simple extensions by introducing non-linear pricing of 
the intermediate input. Nominally, their model concerns duopoly at successive stages, although it would 
be just as accurate to characterize it as an upstream monopolist (constrained by potential entry) selling 
to a downstream duopoly. They assume that the upstream monopolist sets optimal non-linear prices 
with the variable component equal to marginal cost. Many firms do, in fact, charge non-linear prices, so 
the assumption of linear prices is extreme; but the assumption of perfect non-linear prices is at least as 
extreme.19 Moreover, the assumption in effect assumes away pre-merger double marginalization. Just 
as the successive monopoly model assumes away the reason one might be concerned about a harm to 
competition from vertical mergers, the Hart-Tirole model assumes away a key potential benefit.  
A more recent development in the literature on vertical mergers is the assumption of bargaining 
over the price of intermediate inputs.20  There are vertical mergers in which the contracts between 
stages are subject to bargaining, so the assumption that sellers can charge prices that maximize their 
profits is extreme. In addition, as noted above, the Agencies have successfully used bargaining models to 
analyze horizontal mergers in cases (such as hospital mergers) in which bargaining is an essential feature 
of the market setting. These models are an important contribution to the literature as they capture a 
potentially important effect. In the Nash bargaining solution, prices fall somewhere between those that 
 
18 Salinger (1988, 1989) presents models of vertical mergers in successive/complementary Cournot oligopoly. 
Salinger (1991) analyzes vertical mergers when there is differentiated duopoly “upstream” and a multiproduct 
monopolist “downstream.”  
19 Reaching agreement on a “perfect” two-part pricing formula requires agreeing on an appropriate fixed fee 
which, in the presence of uncertainty, would seem to present a formidable barrier. Moreover, to the extent that 
the economic relationship between the two firms require some form of performance (such as marketing) by the 
upstream firm, the optimal two-part pricing formula might entail an upstream margin that would then enter the 
downstream pricing structure.  
20 The literature on applying the Nash bargaining solution to models of vertical mergers and vertical integration is 




maximize the seller’s profits and the minimum the seller would accept rather than enter into no 
contract at all. When the supplier of an input merges with one of its customers, the minimum price it 
would accept from other customers increases. In models that rely on the Nash bargaining solution, this 
effect pushes in the direction of RRC. But even in cases where bargaining over the price of an 
intermediate input occurs, the Nash bargaining solution (particularly if the bargaining parameter is 
assumed but even it if is not) is simply one model of the possible outcomes. If pre-merger prices exceed 
the minimum the vertically integrated firm would accept post-merger, it is not clear that the change in 
the threat point would affect the bargaining outcome.21 In any event, the prices that maximize the 
seller’s profits are one factor in the Nash bargaining prices, so analyzing those prices provides insight 
into the Nash bargaining solution.  
Ordover, Saloner, and Salop (1990) analyze a model of successive duopoly with the upstream 
input being homogeneous and the downstream product being differentiated. That structure would 
seem to be a natural extension of the successive monopoly model, but they make the extreme 
assumption of undifferentiated Bertrand competition at the upstream stage. Thus, like Hart and Tirole, 
they assume away any double marginalization to be eliminated.22 The assumption was useful for 
bringing into sharp relief the limitations of the successive monopoly model for informing antitrust policy 
toward vertical mergers, but that model does not provide a basis for weighing competing effects.  
The model in this paper is closely related to the Salinger (1991) model of a downstream multi-
product monopolist selling the output derived by two differentiated upstream firms. In that model, the 
monopolist is “downstream” and the duopolists are “upstream,” rather than the reverse.23 The results 
 
21 If the Agencies could demonstrate that a merger would make the minimum price that the vertically integrated 
firm would rationally accept for sales of the input to the rival of its merger partner, they would be able to establish 
an RRC effect without relying on the Nash bargaining solution.  
22 Not only does the Ordover, Saloner, and Salop model ignore the direct incentive effect of EDM on the merging 
firm, but it also rules out how the price reduction resulting from EDM places competitive pressure on other firms 
and their suppliers. As the analysis below shows, this indirect competitive effect can be significant. 




are that a vertical merger can have one of three possible qualitative effects. The intuitively obvious 
possibility is that the merged firm lowers the price of the “brand” with which it merges and raises the 
price of the other brand. But there are two other possibilities. The merged firm might lower both prices 
or raise both prices. The latter possibility is an example of a more general property of comparative 
statics for the prices charged by a multi-product firm known as Edgeworth’s Paradox of Taxation 
[Edgeworth (1925)].24 In evaluating the appropriateness of policy conclusions drawn from the successive 
monopoly model, it is natural to focus on the possibility of price increases resulting from a vertical 
merger. But a balanced assessment of the policy implications of that model must also consider the 
possibility that a vertical merger can cause both prices to fall. Since the downstream margin is the 
implicit price of downstream services paid by upstream firms, a reduction in the downstream price of 
the good purchased from the other upstream producer constitutes a reduction in the upstream firm’s 
distribution costs. Thus, in that model, RRC is not an inevitable consequence of a vertical merger even 
when the vertical merger leaves the remaining unintegrated firm completely dependent on its 
competitor for distribution.  
One might suspect that ascertaining which stage is upstream and which is downstream (or 
whether the stages are complementary) is always obvious. Upstream firms sell to downstream firms. 
Downstream firms sell to final consumers. If consumers buy components from different firms, the stages 
seem complementary. At a more abstract level, though, the models differ with respect to the timing of 
decisions. “Upstream” firms move first in the pricing game and “downstream” firms move second, an 
asymmetry which may not reflect economic and business reality. Treating the stages as complementary 
 





with the downstream stage setting a margin rather than a price eliminates the asymmetry implicit in 
treating the stages as successive.25  
III. The Vertical Merger Model 
An upstream monopolist (U) sells an input to two competing downstream firms (D1 and D2) that 
offer differentiated products. Let w1 and w2 be the prices26 the monopolist charges D1 and D2 and p1 and 
p2 be the prices D1 and D2 charge final consumers for their products. Demand for the final goods is given 
by: 




< 0 and 
𝜕𝑄𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑗
> 0 . If we assume constant returns to scale at both stages, the level of costs does 
not matter. Thus, we assume no other costs (that is, other than the cost to downstream firms of 
purchasing the input). Initially, we assume a two-stage game in which U sets its prices in the first stage 
and D1 and D2 set their prices in stage 2. In Section IV, we will alter the timing of the game.  
A. Pre-Merger Equilibrium 
Profits for the two downstream firms are given by: 
(2) π𝑖 = (𝑝𝑖 − 𝑤𝑖) 𝑄𝑖(𝑝𝑖 , 𝑝𝑗)       𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ (1,2), 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 




=  𝑄𝑖(𝑝𝑖, 𝑝𝑗) + (𝑝𝑖 − 𝑤𝑖)
𝜕𝑄𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑖
= 0,    𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ (1,2), 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 
 
25 In the Salinger (1988) model of successive Cournot oligopoly, a necessary condition for a vertical merger to result 
in a price increase is that the upstream stage is more concentrated than the downstream stage. While that result 
might seem like an intuitive RRC result, it reflects the asymmetry between upstream and downstream inherent in 
the timing of decisions in the model. Salinger (1989) discusses why the intuitive labeling of stages may not be 
appropriate and analyzes the model with a Cournot equilibrium at complementary stages allowing for general 
conjectural variations between stages. The result of that model is that the sign of the effect of a vertical merger on 
prices based on an (in principle) observable condition that does not require econometric estimation. The use of 
conjectural variations has fallen out of favor in industrial economics, although the argument for models based on 
conjectural variations would seem to be identical to the argument for models based on the Nash bargaining 
solution. Both approaches are tractable and flexible approaches that give plausible approximations to less 
tractable dynamic models.  




Equation (3) implicitly defines best-response functions for downstream firms (1) and (2): 
(4) 𝑝𝑖
𝑅 = 𝑅𝑖(𝑝𝑗 , 𝑤𝑖
𝑈)           𝑖 ∈ (1,2), 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖  
Let 𝑝𝑖
𝐵 = 𝑃𝑖
𝐵(𝑤1, 𝑤2) and 𝑞𝑖
𝐵 = 𝑄𝑖
𝐵(𝑤1, 𝑤2) be the functions that give the pre-merger Bertrand 






𝐵, 𝑤𝑗 ), 𝑤𝑖]    𝑖 ∈ (1,2), 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 
Let: 
(6) 𝑄𝑖
𝐵(𝑤1, 𝑤2) = 𝑄𝑖[𝑃𝑖
𝐵(𝑤1, 𝑤2), 𝑃𝑗
𝐵(𝑤1, 𝑤2)]    𝑖 ∈ (1,2), 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 
It is straightforward to show that 𝜕𝑃𝑖
𝐵 𝜕𝑤𝑖 > 0⁄  and, assuming i and j are strategic 
complements, 𝜕𝑃𝑖
𝐵 𝜕𝑤𝑗 > 0⁄ , 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 . I will assume that 𝜕𝑄𝑖
𝐵 𝜕𝑤𝑖 < 0⁄  and that 𝜕𝑄𝑖
𝐵 𝜕𝑤𝑗 > 0 , 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖⁄ .  
At stage 1, the upstream monopolist maximizes: 
(7) 𝜋𝑈 = 𝑤1𝑄1
𝐵(𝑤1, 𝑤2) + 𝑤2𝑄2
𝐵(𝑤1, 𝑤2) 

































                              𝑄𝑖
𝐵(𝑤1, 𝑤2) + [𝑤𝑖 − 𝑤𝑗𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝐵 ] = 0                                               𝑖 ∈ (1,2), 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖           
 
Here, 𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝐵  is the diversion ratio from j that U faces when it alters the price of i. The first two terms of the 
first row of equation (8) are price marginal revenue for a stand-alone sole supplier of the input to firm i. 
The last term reflects the effect of U’s sales of the input to Di on its sales of the input to Dj. As the 
second and third lines of (8) show, this term is what Farrell and Shapiro (2010) coined as “upward 




mergers, this “pre-merger UPP” is a marginal opportunity cost to U that has the same effects on its first 
order condition as does any marginal cost.  
The general form of equation (8) does not depend on the nature of the downstream 
equilibrium. Any downstream equilibrium would generate a derived demand relationship for the inputs 
that U sells to D1 and D2 as functions of w1 and w2. Whatever that relationship is, U’s first order 
condition for the price to charge to Di  would consist of the condition for maximizing the stand-alone 
profits from sales to Di with an adjustment for the cross effects with that adjustment being the pre-
merger UPP.  
Equation (8) is a system of two equations with two unknowns. Let 𝑤1
𝑈 and 𝑤2
𝑈 be the values for 
w1 and w2 that solve those equations and are therefore the pre-merger upstream prices. 
Two additional points about equation (8) are worth noting. First, D1 and D2, U’s two “suppliers” 
of downstream services, have some market power that allows them to charge prices above their 
marginal cost. Thus, double marginalization is present. Second, by virtue of being a monopolist, U has an 
inherently stronger bargaining position prior to the merger than do the two downstream firms 
independent of the timing of the decisions.27 That might limit the effect of incorporating bargaining into 
the model.  
B. Post-merger Equilibrium 
The analysis of how a vertical merger affects pricing incentives begins with how it affects the 
profit functions and the resulting first order conditions. I will refer to the shifts in the first order 
conditions as “direct effects” of a vertical merger. But, in equilibrium, these first order conditions 
interact, and these interactions give rise to indirect effects. In drawing practical policy conclusions for 
the treatment of vertical mergers, a key issue is whether these indirect effects are of secondary 
 
27 This point is the key difference between this model and the one in Ordover, Saloner, and Salop (1990). With 
undifferentiated Bertrand duopoly prior to the merger, the upstream firms have no market power and therefore 




importance, in which case policy makers might approach review by focusing on and weighing the 
competing direct effects or, alternatively, whether the indirect effects are of sufficient magnitude that 
they could offset the direct effects. If the indirect effects can dominate the direct effects, then exclusive 
focus on the direct effects can lead to qualitatively wrong conclusions. It is these interactions that make 
the “simple economics” of vertical mergers complicated. 
Suppose that the upstream monopolist merges with D1. Rather than having to purchase the 
intermediate good for 𝑤1, the vertically integrated seller of Good 1 obtains it for marginal cost (of 0). As 
in section A, assume a two-stage game in which the vertically integrated firm (V) sets the price it charges 
D2 for the input (𝑤2
𝑣) in stage 1 and V and D2 set the prices they charge consumers (𝑝1
𝑣 and 𝑝2
𝐼 ) in stage 
2.28 The profits of V are: 
(9)  𝜋𝑣 = 𝑝1𝑄1(𝑝1, 𝑝2) + 𝑤2𝑄2(𝑝2, 𝑝1).  


























. This term is what Moresi and Salop (2013) refer to as vertical upward pricing pressure 
(“vertical UPP”).29 With vertical separation, D1 ignores the effect of its pricing decision on demand for 
D2’s output. When U and D1 merge, the merged entity benefits from D2 sales because it supplies D2 
with a necessary input. Consequently, when it ascertains how a reduction in p1 will affect its profits, it 
 
28 The superscript, “I,” is to emphasize that firm 2 remains independent. 
29 They also introduce a particular index to measure the effect that they call vGUPPI for vertical Generalized 
Upward Pricing Pressure Index” (“vGUPPI”). In general, I am going to the general effect in this paper rather than 




takes account of how increased purchases of Good 1 cannibalize its sales of the intermediate input to 
D2. Both EDM and the vertical UPP are direct effects.  
The direction of how a vertical merger affects the first order condition with respect to p1 
depends on the difference between these two effects. If the EDM effect is larger (smaller) than the 
vertical UPP, then then V charges a lower (higher) p1 for any given value of p2 than does D1. The EDM 
effect depends on w1 prior to the merger whereas the vertical upward pricing pressure depends on w2 
after the merger.30 Thus, if U charges D1 a low margin prior to a merger and V charges a high margin to 
D2 after a merger with D1, the merger of U and D1 creates an incentive to raise prices. But the margins 
both before and after a merger are results of the model, not basic conditions. The question then 
becomes whether there are basic conditions that would generate that combination. 
Equations (3’a) and (3’b) implicitly define the best-response functions:  
(4’a)   𝑝1
𝑅𝑉 = 𝑅1




Note the difference between (4) for D1 and (4’a). D1’s best response function has 𝑤1as an argument 
whereas V’s best response function with respect to the price of Good 1 has 𝑤2. 𝑤1 is not an argument in 
(4’a) because of EDM, but 𝑤2 is an argument because of the vertical UPP.  
The merger does not alter the underlying function that determines D2’s best response, so there 
is no direct effect of the merger on D2 (which is not surprising since D2 is not party to the merger). 
However, there is an indirect effect if the merger causes a change in w2 and therefore a shift in the first 
order condition for D2.   
 
30 As discussed in Section II above, Ordover, Saloner, and Salop (1990) assume undifferentiated Bertrand duopoly 
prior to a vertical merger, so there is no double marginalization. In their model, a vertical merger induces the 
merging firm to stop supplying the downstream rival. Thus, their model does not entail what we are labeling here 
as vertical upward pricing pressure on the price the vertically integrated firm charges consumers. In that model, 










𝐵𝐼(𝑤2)  be the functions that give the post-merger Bertrand
31 

















𝐵𝑉, 𝑤2),𝑤2] = 𝑅1
𝑉[𝑝2





𝐵𝐼 , 𝑤2 ), 𝑤2] = 𝑅2[𝑝1
𝐵𝑉 , 𝑤2]  
After the merger, the merged firm sets only one upstream price rather than two in stage 1. The first 
order condition that determines that price is: 
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𝑣 be the value of 𝑤2 that solves (8’). 
As in (8), the first two terms of the first line of (8’) are terms for maximizing the stand-alone 
profits of selling the input to D2, and the remaining terms reflect the cross-product effect. The third 
term of (8’) resembles the third term of (8) except that the cross-price derivative of the quantity of good 
1 with respect to w2 is multiplied by the downstream price of good 1, 𝑃1
𝐵𝑉(𝑤2) =  𝑝1
𝐵𝑉, rather than the 
price of the input that the pre-merger U has sold to D1 when it was independent. This term is post-
merger UPP and the difference between 𝑝1
𝐵𝑉  and 𝑤1
𝑈 is an RRC effect of the merger.  
Equation (8’) has one additional term that is not present in (8). It captures a second RRC effect 
that is a consequence of the vertical structure of the model. By raising its rival’s costs, V affects 
downstream competition and, therefore, the price it receives for Good 1. Assuming that the goods are 
 




strategic complements, an increase in w2 softens downstream competition and provides V with an 
additional RRC incentive.  
In comparing (8) and (8’), it might initially appear that the first two terms are identical and that 
the only effect of the vertical merger on V’s incentives with respect to w2 is the RRC effects, but that is 
not correct. In both cases, the first two terms represent the conditions for the value of w2 that would 
maximize stand-alone profits from the sale of the input to D2. To the extent that a vertical merger 
causes a change in p1, it affects the demand for D2’s output and, in turn, (1) D2’s demand for the input 
and (2) the value of w2 that maximizes the stand-alone profits of sales of the input to D2. Even though V 
is not a stand-alone seller of the input to D2, the price that would maximize its stand-alone sales of the 
input to D2 is a factor that affects its post-merger incentives in setting w2.32  
This competitive effect depends on how p1 affects demand for Good 2. If it is small, then EDM 
does have much of an effect on the value of w2 that maximizes stand-alone profits from sales of the 
input to D2. In contrast, the incentive to raise D2’s costs depends on how p2 affects the demand for 
Good 1. (The vertical UPP, like the competitive effect, depends on how p1 affects the demand for Good 
2.) Since the competitive effect and RRC depend on different cross-price effects, asymmetry in the cross-
price effects could cause the RRC effect to be large when the competitive effect is small or vice versa. 
Suppose, for example, that changes in p2 have a bigger effect on demand for Q1 than changes in p1 have 
on demand for Q2, a condition that would be conducive for a merger of U and D1 to create an incentive 
to raise prices. But, that same condition would imply that a merger of U and D2 would create an 
incentive to lower prices. 
Figure 1 shows pre-merger best response functions as well as dotted lines that divide the graph 
into quadrants. As it shows upward-sloping best response functions, it presumes that goods 1 and 2 are 
strategic complements. The effect of the merger on the prices for Goods 1 and 2 depend on how the 
 




best response functions shift as a result of the merger. The graph identifies 5 distinct regions of merger 
outcomes that might be possible.33  
Region A is when the vertical UPP dominates EDM, causing the best response function for p1 to 
shift the right. In that case, the competitive effect reinforces the RRC effect with respect to w2, so the 
best response function for p2 shifts up. Such a result resembles Edgeworth’s Paradox in that the 
elimination of double marginalization due to the merger results in an increase in both prices. 
 In Regions B-D, EDM dominates the vertical UPP, so the best response function for p1 shifts to 
the left. As a result, the competitive effect goes in the opposite direction of the vertical UPP. But, in 
those regions, the vertical UPP dominates the competitive effect so the best response function for p2 
shifts up. Depending on the relative magnitude of the shifts, the net result can be an increase in both 
prices (B), a decrease in p1 and in increase in p2 (C), or a decrease in both prices (D). The final possibility 
is that the competitive effect dominates the RRC effect, causing the best response function for p2 to shift 
down. In that region, both prices drop.    
 
33 I say “might,” because I have not generated examples in which the effect of a vertical merger is in regions D or E, 







IV. Complementary Merger Model 
Whatever the intuitive appeal of modeling upstream firms as maximizing profits taking account 
of the derived demand for the inputs, this structure rests on a strong implicit assumption about the 
relationship between “upstream” and “downstream” firms that may not reflect their economic 
relationship. The model in Section III is a pricing game in which the upstream firm moves first. The 
significance of the assumption is not merely that the upstream firm gets to set take-it-or-leave-it prices 
without giving downstream firms any opportunity to bargain. Rather, the upstream firm gets to 
anticipate the full downstream reaction when it sets its prices whereas the downstream firms have to 



























merged firm sets w2 anticipating how D2 (and, for that matter, its own downstream division) will 
respond but sets p1 taking p2 as constant. 
A possible solution to the problem, which dates back to Cournot, is to treat the stages as 
complementary. The importance of this assumption is not what downstream firms actually set. Given 
the upstream prices, it does not matter whether a downstream firm sets its margin rather than its price; 
one implies the other. Rather, the significance is what the upstream firm assumes about downstream 
firms. In a Nash equilibrium given the assumption that the stages are complementary, the upstream firm 
assumes that downstream firms pass the input price dollar-for-dollar through to the output price. An 
advantage of this perspective is that after the merger, the merged firm sets its upstream price and 
downstream margin simultaneously and based on a common set of assumptions about D2’s behavior. 
Treating the stages as complementary, 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖 + 𝑚𝑖 for i ∈ (1,2) where 𝑚𝑖 is the downstream 
margin taken on good i.  
When they are independent, profits for D1 and D2 are given by: 
(10)  π𝑖 = 𝑚𝑖 𝑄𝑖(𝑤𝑖 + 𝑚𝑖 , 𝑤𝑗 + 𝑚𝑗)       𝑖 ∈ (1,2), 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 
Profits for U are given by: 
(11) 𝜋𝑈 = 𝑤1𝑄1(𝑤1 + 𝑚1, 𝑤2 + 𝑚2) + 𝑤2𝑄2(𝑤2 + 𝑚2, 𝑤1 + 𝑚1) 




=  𝑄𝑖(𝑤𝑖 + 𝑚𝑖, 𝑤𝑗 + 𝑚𝑗) + 𝑚𝑖
𝜕𝑄𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑖
= 0,    𝑖 ∈ (1,2), 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 










 = 0, 𝑖 ∈ (1,2), 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 
Equation (12) is, in effect, identical to equation (3). Equations (8) and (13) are similar in that the 
first two terms reflect the stand-alone profits from the sale of the input sold to (or used in conjunction 
with the output of) D2 and the last term reflects pre-merger UPP that arises because U is a two-product 
monopolist. The difference between them is that in (8), the demand relationship giving rise to the 




on final consumer demand. Figure 2 illustrates the difference. The “Base Case” in Figure 2 is the 
downstream equilibrium shown in Figure 1. In the complementary merger model, when U considers 
raising w1, it holds m1, m2, and w2 constant. Holding m1 constant is equivalent to assuming one-for-one 
pass through of the input price to the final good price, and holding m2 and w2 constant implies that p2 is 
constant. As a result, in choosing w1 in the complementary merger model, U assumes that an increase 
will cause a shift from point a to point d. In contrast, in the vertical merger model, it assumes that an 
increase in w1 will cause a shift from point a to c. It is useful to divide the change into two steps. The first 
is from a to b, which reflects the shift in D1’s best response function holding p2 constant. In Figure 2, the 
shift is less than one-for-one.34 The magnitude of the shift is an example of pass-through and can, as a 
general matter, be less than, equal to, or greater than one-for-one. For linear demand, the rate of pass-
through is ½; but, as Weyl and Fabringer (2013) show, convexity in the demand relationship increases 
the rate of pass-through. The pass-through rate can exceed 1 for sufficiently convex demand curves. The 
second step is a movement along D1’s best response function. Holding w1 and w2 constant, a movement 
along D1’s best response function entails increases in m1 and m2, which are complementary to U. As a 
result, the movement from b to c lowers U’s profits. As I show in Section V, with linear demand, the 
effect of incomplete pass-through dominates the effect of the adjustments in the downstream margins, 
so the derivative of U’s profits with respect to one of its prices is positive in the vertical merger model at 
the pre-merger equilibrium prices in the complementary merger model. As a result, the pre-merger 
prices are lower with linear demand in the complementary merger model than in the successive merger 
model. The result is not, however, general. When pass-through is at least 1, pre-merger prices are higher 











With the merger, the vertically integrated firm chooses p1 and w2. Its profits are given by: 
(14) 𝜋𝑣 = 𝑝1𝑄1(𝑝1, 𝑤2 + 𝑚2) + 𝑤2𝑄2(𝑤2 + 𝑚2, 𝑝1).  























The qualitative effects of a merger between U and D1 are similar to the effects in the vertical 


























P1 = w1 + m1
Successive vs. Complementary Model


























, is the EDM effect. Going in the opposite direction, (15) has the term 𝑤2
𝜕𝑄2
𝜕𝑝1
, which is the vertical 
UPP. As with (12), the direction of the shift turns on the net effect. In both cases, the first two terms 
represent the derivative of the stand-alone profits from sales of the input to D2 with respect to w2. In 
(16), V’s calculation of the stand-alone profit maximizing price depends on the derivative of final 
consumer demand with respect to p2. In (13), the calculation relies on the derivative of D2’s derived 
demand for the input. As in (13), there is an RRC term that reflects the effect of V’s sales of the 
intermediate input to D2 on its sales of Good 1. Again, its calculation of that effect is based on final 
consumer demand in (16), not the derived the demand for the input, as in (13). In contrast to equation 
(13), equation (16) does not have a fourth term reflecting how a change in w2 affects the price V 
receives for its sales of Good 1. The difference is because in the simultaneous pricing game, V optimizes 
with respect to w2 holding p1 constant. 
As in the vertical merger model, the vertical merger does not affect the form of D2’s best 
response function. However, a change in w2 would cause D2’s best response function to shift. If w2 




is multiplied by 𝑝1 after the merger compared with 𝑤1 before the merger, which captures the RRC 
incentive created by the merger. As in the vertical merger model, there is also a competitive effect. A 
change in p1 affects 𝑄2(𝑝1, 𝑤2 + 𝑚2) + 𝑤2
𝜕𝑄2
𝜕𝑝2
, the “stand-alone” price marginal revenue from selling 
the intermediate input to D2. If a reduction in p1 would cause the stand-alone profit-maximizing value of 
w2 to drop, then this effect would have the opposite sign as the RRC effect.  
The main lesson from sections III and IV is that even with this very simple structure of monopoly 
at one stage and duopoly at the other, the effect of a vertical merger on price incentives is complicated. 
 
35 If w2 increases, p2 increases even if m2 drops (as long as the slope of the best response function for m2 with 




Vertical mergers can result in RRC, vertical UPP, and harm to at least some consumers, but neither RRC 
nor vertical UPP result from all vertical mergers and at least some (and in some cases all) consumers 
benefit from some vertical mergers. The range of possible qualitative outcomes stands in distinct 
contrast to what the model predicts about the effect of a horizontal merger between D1 and D2. Only 
very weak assumptions about demand, the timing of moves, and the nature of equilibrium are needed 
to predict that a horizontal merger would result in price increases.  
One might hypothesize that while a wide range of qualitative outcomes from a vertical merger is 
possible, the most likely outcome is region C in Figure 1 (combined with some RRC). If so, one might 
further hypothesize that merger enforcement should focus on where within region C the outcome lies 
and to then use the result to assess whether the gains to some consumers outweigh the losses to 
others. As Section V shows, such a presumption is not warranted. 
V. Linear Demand 
In this section, I begin by analyzing both the vertical merger model and the complementary 
merger model for the special case of linear demand.  
A. Vertical Merger Model 
Let the demand curves be given by: 
 
(17) 𝑄𝑖(𝑝𝑖, 𝑝𝑗) =  𝑏𝑖0 − 𝑏𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑗  𝑝𝑗  ,                       𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ (1,2), 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 
Profits for the two downstream firms are: 
(18) Π𝑖 = (𝑝𝑖 − 𝑤𝑖)  (𝑏𝑖0 − 𝑏𝑖𝑖  𝑝𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑗 𝑝𝑗)               𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ (1,2), 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 




= 𝑏𝑖0 −  2 𝑏𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑗  𝑝𝑗 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑖   = 0,    𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ (1,2), 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 
Solving (19) for 𝑝𝑖  and taking the derivative with respect to 𝑤𝑖 yields the familiar result that the 
derivative of the profit-maximizing price with respect to an input price along a linear demand curve, 




Solving the two equations given by (19) simultaneously gives the Bertrand equilibrium prices as 
a function of the two input prices: 
(20) 𝑃𝑖
𝐵(𝑤𝑖, 𝑤𝑗) =  
2𝑏𝑗𝑗𝑏𝑖0 +𝑏𝑖𝑗 𝑏𝑗0+2𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑗𝑗 𝑤𝑖+ 𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑏𝑗𝑗𝑤𝑗
4𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑗𝑗− 𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑏𝑗𝑖
    𝑖 ∈ (1,2), 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 




2𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑗𝑗𝑏𝑖0 +𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑗 𝑏𝑗0−𝑏𝑖𝑖(2 𝑏𝑖𝑖 𝑏𝑗𝑗−𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑏𝑗𝑖) 𝑤𝑖+ 𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑗𝑗𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑗
4𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑗𝑗− 𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑏𝑗𝑖
       𝑖 ∈ (1,2), 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖      













2           𝑖 ∈ (1,2), 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖      
One simplification of (22) to consider is symmetric cross-price effects: b12 = b21. If the good in 
question is a sufficiently small component of consumer budgets that income effects are negligible, then 
the equality of the cross-price effects is the Slutsky condition. Thus, not only is the condition 
considerably weaker than complete symmetry of demand, there is an economic justification (as opposed 




𝑏𝑗𝑗 𝑏𝑖0+ 𝑏𝑖𝑗 𝑏𝑗0
2(𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑗𝑗− 𝑏𝑖𝑗
2 )
   𝑖 ∈ (1,2), 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖      









After a merger between U and D1, the merged firm’s profit function is: 
(24) 𝜋𝑉 = 𝑝1(𝑏10 − 𝑏11𝑝1 + 𝑏12𝑝2) + 𝑤2(𝑏20 + 𝑏21𝑝1 + 𝑏22𝑝2)  




= 𝑏10 − 2𝑏11𝑝1 + 𝑏12 𝑝2  +  𝑏21𝑤2 = 0    
Compare (25) with (19) for i = 1. They look quite similar, but there is an important difference. Equation 




from equation (25) reflects the elimination of double marginalization whereas the inclusion of 𝑏21𝑤2 
reflects vertical upward pricing pressure. These are the two direct effects described in Section III. Which 
is greater determines whether the first order condition with respect to p1 in Figure 1 shifts up or down.  
The Bertrand prices are, then,   
(26) 𝑃1
𝐵𝑉(𝑤2) =  





𝐵𝑉(𝑤2) =  
2𝑏11𝑏20+ 𝑏21 𝑏10+( 𝑏21
2 + 2𝑏11𝑏22)𝑤2 
4𝑏11𝑏22−𝑏12𝑏21
 
Comparing (26) and (27) with (20), the numerator of (20) for i = 1 has the term 2𝑏11𝑏22𝑤1, 
which reflects the effect of D1’s cost of purchasing the input prior to the merger, whereas the 
numerator of (26) has the term 2𝑏21𝑏22 𝑤2, which reflects the vertical upward pricing pressure. With 
respect to the price of good 2, the numerator of equation (20) for i = 2 has the term  𝑏21𝑏11𝑤1 whereas 
the numerator of (27) has the term 𝑏21
2 𝑤2. The difference between them reflects how the difference 
between D1’s direct cost of the input prior to the merger (𝑤1per unit of output) with V’s indirect 
opportunity cost arising from vertical upward pricing pressure (𝑤2 𝑏21 𝑏11)⁄  affects the Bertrand price 
that D2 charges. 
Substituting (26) and (27) into (24) and optimizing with respect to w2 gives the price V charges 
















Imposing the Slutsky condition, equation (30) simplifies to: 














Comparing equations (28’) and (22’), one can show:36 
Result 1: Assuming (1) linear demand for the final goods, (2) 𝑏𝑖𝑗 = 𝑏𝑗𝑖> 0, and (3) 𝑏11𝑏22 −








Result 1 states that when the Slutsky condition holds in the vertical merger model, the vertically 
merged firm charges a lower price for the input to D2 than the unintegrated firm. It does so despite the 
direct effect of the incentive to raise its rival’s costs. The reduction in the price occurs because the 
indirect (competitive) effect is larger than the RRC effect.  






























Comparing equations (29) and (30) with (23), it is straightforward to show the following: 
Result 2: Assuming (1) linear demand for the final goods, (2) 𝑏𝑖𝑗 = 𝑏𝑗𝑖> 0, and (3) 𝑏11𝑏22 −





One can see that Result 1 implies Result 2 in Figure 1. Given the reduction in w2, the vertical 
merger causes D2’s best response function to shift down in Figure 2. As the vertically integrated firm’s 
best response function shifts to the left, the new downstream equilibrium is in region E, which is a 
region in which both post-merger final good prices are below the pre-merger prices.  
While not all demand curves are linear, linear demand curves are not inherently perverse or 
even necessarily unusual. Thus, the result that with linear demands and symmetric cost effects, the 
effect of a vertical merger falls within region A in Figure 1 means that there can be no general 
presumption that region C is the normal outcome with all the other regions being unusual cases.  
Result 2 has a further policy implication. Since the equality of cross-price effects with linear 
demand is sufficient for a vertical merger to result in the lowering of both prices, the same result 
obviously holds for completely symmetric demand. Even so, one might hypothesize that if a vertical 




prices, one might be able to show that a vertical merger between an upstream monopolist and one of 
two asymmetrically situated downstream firms could be presumed to result in consumer harm. That is, 
one might imagine a rule under which, given a monopoly-duopoly structure, the legality of a vertical 
merger turns on the market share of the proposed downstream merger partner.37 Result 2 casts doubt 
on whether economic theory can provide support for such a rule. Asymmetry in demand does not 
preclude the equality of cross-price effects. In fact, that condition remains the natural base case even 
with asymmetric demands. As a result, even in the monopoly-duopoly case, any model predicting an 
adverse static price effect from a vertical merger would necessarily be based on non-linearities in 
demand and/or asymmetric cross-price effects.    
Since market demand curves need not obey the Slutsky condition (even if individual demand 
curves do), it is interesting to consider the nature of the asymmetry in cross-price effects that would 
give rise to the conclusion that a vertical merger would result in price increases. The coefficient 𝑏12 is 
the source of the vertical upward pricing pressure on 𝑤2 whereas 𝑏21 is the source of the competitive 
effect through which a reduction in p1 causes the demand curve for Good 2 to shift back. Thus, the 
condition that is most conducive to an increase in 𝑤2 is 𝑏21= 0.  
B. Complementary Merger Model 
Continuing with the assumption of linear demand curves, now consider the complementary 
merger model. The demand curves are:  
(31)  𝑄𝑖(𝑝𝑖 , 𝑝𝑗) =  𝑏𝑖0 − 𝑏𝑖𝑖(𝑤𝑖 + 𝑚𝑖) 𝑝𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑗(𝑤𝑗 + 𝑚𝑗) ,                       𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ (1,2), 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 
where 𝑚𝑖 is the margin chosen by downstream firm i.  
When D1 and D2 are both independent of U, profits for the two downstream firms are given by: 
(32) Π𝑖 = 𝑚𝑖[𝑏𝑖0 − 𝑏𝑖𝑖(𝑤𝑖 + 𝑚𝑖) + 𝑏𝑖𝑗(𝑤𝑗 + 𝑚𝑗)]               𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ (1,2), 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 
 
37 If economic analysis could justify such a rule, then it would matter which of the two possible vertical mergers 
would be illegal. Suppose an economic model predicted that the upstream monopolist could merge with the larger 
of the two downstream firms but not the smaller of the two. As a matter of practical public policy, such a result 








= 𝑏𝑖0 − 2 𝑏𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑗(𝑤𝑗 + 𝑚𝑗)     = 0,    𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ (1,2), 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 
These reactions functions are substantively equivalent to (21) with the notation changed to 
reflect the perspective that the two stages are complementary.  
The profits of the upstream firm are: 
(34) 𝜋𝑈 = 𝑤1[𝑏10 − 𝑏11(𝑤1 + 𝑚1) + 𝑏12(𝑤2 + 𝑚2)] + 𝑤2[𝑏20 + 𝑏21(𝑤1 + 𝑚1) +
 𝑏22(𝑤2 + 𝑚2)]  




= 𝑏𝑖0 − 2𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑤1 − 𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑗(𝑤𝑗 + 𝑚𝑗) + 𝑏𝑗𝑖𝑤𝑗 = 0     𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ (1,2), 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 









𝑏𝑗0          𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ (1,2), 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 




          𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ (1,2), 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 
where:  
 𝐷𝑐 =  9𝑏𝑖𝑖
2𝑏𝑗𝑗
2 − 8 𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑗𝑗𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑏𝑗𝑖 −  𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑗𝑗𝑏𝑖𝑗




When the Slutsky condition holds, (36) simplifies to: 
(36’) 𝑚𝑖 = 
3𝑏𝑗𝑗𝑏𝑖0+𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑏𝑗0
9 𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑗𝑗−𝑏𝑖𝑗
2                 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ (1,2), 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 
(The Slutsky condition does not simplify (37)).  
If U and D1 merge, the merged firm sets a final price, p1, for good 1, without decomposing it into 
upstream and downstream components. Its profit function is: 
(38) 𝜋𝑉 = 𝑝1[𝑏10 − 𝑏11𝑝1 + 𝑏12(𝑤2 + 𝑚2)] + 𝑤2[𝑏20 + 𝑏21𝑝1 + 𝑏22(𝑤2 + 𝑚2)]  









= 𝑏20 + (𝑏12 + 𝑏21)𝑝1 − 2𝑏22𝑤2 − 𝑏22𝑚2 = 0  


























When the Slutsky condition holds, (43) simplifies to: 
















































) < 0, 
 
where the superscripts “A” and “B” denote after and before the merger of U with D1.  
 
Equation (44) establishes Result 3: 
Result 3: Assuming (1) linear demand for the final goods, (2) 𝑏𝑖𝑗 = 𝑏𝑗𝑖> 0, and (3) 𝑏11𝑏22 −
𝑏12𝑏21> 0 in the complementary merger model, a merger between U and D1 induces the 
vertically integrated firm to raise the price of the input it charges D2. 
Equations (45) and (46) establish Result 4:  
Result 4: Assuming (1) linear demand for the final goods, (2) 𝑏𝑖𝑗 = 𝑏𝑗𝑖> 0, and (3) 𝑏11𝑏22 −
𝑏12𝑏21> 0 in the complementary merger model, a vertical merger between U and one of the two 
firms at the adjacent stage results in a decrease in the combined prices consumers pay for both 
goods. 
 
Result 3 implies an RRC effect from a vertical merger. Thus, given the assumptions of the model, 
the results suggest that a challenge to a vertical merger would be appropriate if an increase in an input 
price meets the legal standard for what constitutes an anticompetitive effect. If, however, the legal 
standard requires a showing of harm to consumers, Result 4 implies (again, given the other model 




The key parameter under which the model implies the greatest competitive harm from a merger 




























2 ) (9 𝑏11𝑏22−𝑏12
2 )
> 0 
Equation (47) states that even when the demand parameters are most conducive to an 
anticompetitive effect of a merger, the EDM effect dominates the vertical upward pricing pressure with 
respect to the price of the good produced entirely by the merged firm. In other words, an outcome 
similar to Edgeworth’s Paradox does not arise in the complementary goods model given linear demands. 
However, absent any competitive effect, the increase in the price of the input the merged firm charges 
D2 insures an increase in the price consumers pay for the good D2 sells. 
C. Other functional forms 
While linear demand systems are not perverse, a natural question to ask is the extent to which 
the above results depend on the linearity assumption.  
The constant elasticity functional form is not appropriate for this setting because the profit 
function for the upstream firm is unbounded under such an assumption. As it increases one price to 
infinity under such an assumption, it makes demand for the other good infinitely high (even when the 
price for the other good is above unit costs). The same point applies to an exponential functional form. 
Here, I consider three alternative functional forms: 
 
(50) 𝑄𝑖(𝑝𝑖, 𝑝𝑗) =  𝑙𝑛(𝛿𝑖0 − 𝛿𝑖𝑖  𝑝𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖𝑗  𝑝𝑗  ),                             𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ (1,2), 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 
 





(52) 𝑄𝑖(𝑝𝑖, 𝑝𝑗) =  
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜃𝑖0− 𝜃𝑖1𝑝𝑖 )
1+𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜃𝑖0− 𝜃𝑖1𝑝𝑖 )+𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜃𝑗0− 𝜃𝑗1𝑝𝑗 )
,                 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ (1,2), 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 
 
The demand curves for the form given by Equation (52) are concave to the origin while those 
given by Equation (53) are convex to the origin. In light of the Weyl and Fabinger (2013) results linking 
the rate of cost pass-through for a single-product monopolist to the curvature of the demand curve, one 
might suspect that the effect of eliminating double marginalization might also depend critically on the 
curvature of the demand curves. Comparing results for equations (52) and (53) with the results for linear 
demand provide insight into whether that hypothesis is true. 
Table 1 shows the results for the vertical stages model for specific sets of parameters for linear 
demand and equations (50) – (52). (Equation (50) is “Semi-log 1” and Equation (51) is “Semi-log 2.”) For 
linear demand and the two semi-log forms, the cross-effect parameters are half the own-effect 
parameters, so they reflect substantial but imperfect substitution between the two goods. As was 
shown in Section III, the qualitative effects of a vertical merger with linear demand and symmetric cost 
effects are general. A vertical merger between U and D1 not only causes a reduction in all downstream 
prices, it also induces the merged firm to cut the price it charges D2 for the input. In addition to making 
the cross-price parameters half the absolute value of the own-price parameters for the two semi-log 
functional forms, I chose parameters that yielded approximately the same pre-merger prices. While I 
have not proved the generality of the results for the other functional forms, the qualitative results 
appear robust for symmetric demands. 
In Table 1, for all four functional forms, a vertical merger causes the price of the final good sold 
by the merged firm to drop. Not only for linear demand but also for both semi-log forms, the price of 
the good sold by the remaining unintegrated firm (Good 2) drops as well. In contrast, for logit demand, 




For linear demand and both semi-log forms, the vertically integrated firm reduces the price of 
the intermediate good. That is, there is no RRC effect for those demand curves. With logit demand, a 
vertical merger causes an increase in w2. Indeed, not only does w2 increase, but the merged firm raises 
w2 above P1.38 At that price, D2 still buys some of the input from V in the model. In practice, such a 
behavior would be called a “price squeeze” and would be interpreted as being, in effect, full foreclosure. 
If there were either theoretical or empirical support for the proposition that logit demand is the right 
functional form for demand, then this result might be taken as a theoretical basis for asserting that 
economic theory predicts an anticompetitive effect of vertical mergers at least in the monopoly-
differentiated duopoly case. But the widespread use of logit demand is in large part because it can be 
calibrated with market share data rather than econometric estimates of demand. The less stringent data 
requirements are not a basis for concluding that logit demand provides the best fit and, indeed, the 
form entails strong implicit assumptions about the degree of substitutability between the goods. Since 
the other functional forms do not give a comparable result, one might question the robustness of 
conclusions about the effect of a vertical merger based on a model with logit demand. 
While the results suggest that under a wide range of circumstances, the vertically integrated 
firm charges a lower price to its downstream rival than it does without the merger, the downstream 
rival nonetheless experiences a profit reduction in virtually all the simulations.39 Thus, the model  results 
suggest that D2 would prefer that U and D1 not be allowed to merge. If downstream production entails 
fixed costs, then the vertical merger between U and D1 might, depending on the level of fixed costs, 
 
38 One can show analytically that in the complementary good model with logit demand, the price the vertically 
integrated firm charges its downstream competitor for the input equals its downstream price for its good. In the 
successive monopoly model, in which the downstream competitor’s pass-through rate for cost increases is less 
than 100%, the result that w2 > p1 in the vertical merger model is not surprising.  
39 The one exception is a very slight increase in the D2’s profits in the vertical merger model with the first of the 






make it impossible for D2 to operate profitably.40 Some might argue that a vertical merger that would 
drive D2 from the market should be viewed as anticompetitive. That may be a defensible position; but if 
the reduction in D2’s profits is due to a reduction in p1 rather than an increase in w2, the policy would 
amount to protecting a competitor in order to protect competition. The same logic would justify 
blocking a horizontal merger that creates such substantial efficiencies that competing firms cannot 
survive.41   
VI. Conclusions 
The broad question I have sought to address in this paper is whether, once one takes the 
possibility of RRC and vertical upward pricing pressure into account, economic theory predicts that 
vertical mergers in concentrated industries have the same (or at least similar) effects on pricing 
incentives as do horizontal mergers. When the European Commission stated in its non-horizontal 
merger guidelines that “[n]on-horizontal mergers are generally less likely to significantly impede 
effective competition than horizontal mergers,” it was likely heeding what it believed to be a consensus 
among economists. Yet, some quite prominent economists have questioned the validity of that 
consensus.   
To the extent that the foundation for a consensus among economists was the successive 
monopoly model, it was shakier than perhaps many economists would have admitted. In assessing what 
economic theory predicts about vertical mergers, one must consider the incentive companies have to 
raise their rivals’ costs and vertical upward pricing pressure. However, incorporating those factors into a 
model that also accounts for EDM reveals another possible effect of a vertical merger. Eliminating 
 
40 Further analysis would be needed to conclude definitively that V would charge a price that would drive D2 from 
the market. One would need to analyze how exit of D2 would affect demand for Good 1 and what the vertically 
integrated firm would earn if it limited its price to D2 to allow it to remain in business.  
41 If competition authority blocks a horizontal merger on such grounds, the merged firms are sometimes said to 




double marginalization does not merely eliminate a pricing distortion for the merging firms. To the 
extent that it induces the merging firm to lower the price it charges consumers, it places competitive 
pressure on rival firms and their suppliers. Remarkably, this is the case even when the merging is the 
sole supplier to the rival; and this effect can be stronger than the RRC effect. 
The possibility that this competitive effect can result in a reduction in all prices is an example of 
robust theory. It does not arise just in the model in this paper. The same phenomenon arises in a model 
of successive Cournot oligopoly and it arises in a model of a downstream monopolist purchasing from an 
duopolists upstream. It follows that theories that vertical mergers in concentrated markets necessarily 
give rise to an increase in rivals costs (much less any increase in consumer prices) cannot be robust. Such 
price increases can occur in some circumstances, but theory nonetheless provides a solid foundation for 
competition authorities to treat vertical mergers differently from horizontal mergers, even in 
concentrated markets.  
In U.S. antitrust law, mergers of firms with sufficiently large shares in sufficiently concentrated 
industries – the extreme case being merger to monopoly – are “presumed” to be anticompetitive. This 
feature of merger law is referred to as a “structural presumption.” The structural assumptions 
underlying the models in this paper would seem to be conducive to finding downstream price increases 
that follow from RRC; but they do not. These results suggest that economic theory is unlikely to provide 
a justification for a structural presumption with respect to vertical mergers based on static pricing 
incentives.42  
Absent a structural presumption, a challenge to a vertical merger based on static pricing 
incentives would have to be based on a methodology for distinguishing anticompetitive from 
 
42 An exception is so-called diagonal mergers in which a firm seeks to buy a firm that supplies (and is the only 
potential supplier to) its competitor(s) but from which it does not purchase inputs. A notable historical example is 
the 1994 merger of AT&T and McCaw. McCaw was a cellular telephone provider. AT&T supplied equipment to 




procompetitive vertical mergers. If that methodology is to be merger simulation, the above results cast 
doubt on whether any model-based prediction would be robust to assumptions about functional form, 
the timing of decisions, and so on. 
Without either a structural presumption or a reliable methodology for demonstrating 
anticompetitive static pricing effects from a vertical merger, the prospects for successful challenges to 
vertical mergers based on static pricing effects would seem to be quite dim, particularly given that in the 
U.S., merging parties can force the Agencies to prove their case in court. This is not to suggest that 
vertical mergers should be per se illegal or even that there cannot be any sort of structural presumption 
against them. What it does suggest is that the underyling theory of anticompetitive harm cannot be 
static pricing effects arising from RRC and/or vertical upward pricing pressure. A more promising theory 
to justify a challenge is potential competition. A general hurdle to successfully bringing potential 
competition cases is demonstrating that the number of potential competitors is sufficiently limited that 
eliminating one substantially reduces the competitive restraint that potential competition poses to a 
firm that faces limited existing competition. When, however, there is successive or complementary 
dominance in an industry, the dominant firm at one stage has the biggest incentive to enter or promote 
entry against the dominant firm at the other stage. Static pricing theory would predict that a merger of 
such firms would result in lower prices, but static pricing effects are not the only possible merger effects. 
As long as the dominant firm at one stage would benefit from an adjacent stage being more 
competitive, it stands to reap a benefit from entry at the adjacent stage that no other firm would get. 
Not only would challenges to vertical mergers based on potential competition rest on less fragile 
theoretical footing, a vertical merger policy based on potential competition would be easier for courts 
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Linear Semi-log (1) Semi-log (2) Logit 
   Intercept 10 9 10 7 
   Own 2 2 8 1 


















   Prices         
w1 5.0  5.1  4.8  5.0  
w2 5.0 4.7 5.1 4.7 4.8 4.5 5.0 5.9 
P1 6.7 4.0 6.4 5.7 6.8 4.9 6.6 5.7 
P2 6.7 5.8 6.4 6.0 6.8 6.0 6.6 7.1 
?̅?  4.4  5.8  5.3  6.0 
   Quantities         
𝑞1 3.3 7.9 1.0 1.3 2.3 4.4 0.4 0.7 
𝑞2 3.3 2.3 1.0 1.0 2.3 2.0 0.4 0.2 
𝑞1 + 𝑞2 6.7 6.7 1.9 2.3 4.7 6.4 0.7 0.8 
   Profits         
𝜋𝑈/𝜋𝑉 33.3 42.1 9.9 12.0 22.5 30.8 3.7 4.7 
𝜋1, 𝜋2/𝜋2 5.6 2.6 1.2 1.3 4.7 3.2 0.6 0.2 
𝜋𝑉 − (𝜋𝑈 + 𝜋1)  3.2  0.9  3.7  0.4 






Complementary Merger Simulation Results 
Parameters 
Functional form 
Linear Semi-log (1) Semi-log (2) Logit 
   Intercept 10 9 10 7 
   Own 2 2 8 1 


















   Prices         
w1 4.0  3.8  4.2  4.7  
w2 4.0 4.2 3.8 3.8 4.2 4.0 4.7 5.7 
m1 2.0  1.9  2.1  1.7  
m2 2.0 1.7 1.9 1.8 2.1 1.6 1.7 1.2 
w1+ m1 6.0 5.0 5.7 5.3 6.3 4.7 6.4 5.7 
w2+ m2 6.0 5.8 5.7 5.6 6.3  6.4 6.9 
w +  𝑚̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  4.4  5.8  5.3  6.0 
   Quantities         
𝑞1 4.0 5.8 1.2 1.4 2.7 4.6 0.4 0.6 
𝑞2 4.0 3.3 1.2 1.1 2.7 2.3 0.4 0.2 
𝑞1 + 𝑞2 8.0 9.2 2.4 2.5 5.3 6.9 0.8 0.8 
   Profits         
𝜋𝑈/𝜋𝑉 32.0 43.1 9.0 11.7 22.2 30.7 3.7 4.7 
𝜋1, 𝜋2/𝜋2 8.0 5.6 2.3 2.0 5.6 3.9 0.7 0.2 
𝜋𝑉 − (𝜋𝑈 + 𝜋1)  3.1  0.4  2.9  0.3 







Proof of Theorem 1: 
A standard condition on the demand relationship is: 



















 solve equation (15),  and, for any m1 , m2 > 0, consider ?̃?1 = 𝑝1
𝐽
− 𝑚1and ?̃?2 = 𝑝2
𝐽
−
 𝑚2. For both composite prices to be less than the joint profit-maximizing prices, then equation (13) 
evaluated at ?̃?1and ?̃?2 must both be negative. Since we are evaluating the first order conditions for the 
complementary monopoly model at the prices that maximize joint profits, the quantities are equal to 
those that solve (15). Thus, for (14) to be negative for i = 1, j =2:  





























or      





















Similarly, for (14) to be negative for i = 2, j =1:  
















































which contradicts (A1).  
Proof of Result 1 
Equation (24’) i = 2 implies:  
(A6)  𝑤2
𝑈 = 
𝑏11 𝑏20+ 𝑏12 𝑏10
2(𝑏11𝑏22− 𝑏12
2 )
     







=   
𝑏12𝑏22(8𝑏11𝑏22 + 𝑏12
2 )𝑏10 + (8𝑏11
2 𝑏22
2 + 𝑏12
4 )𝑏20 − 𝑏22(8𝑏11𝑏22 + 𝑏12
2 )(𝑏11 𝑏20 + 𝑏12 𝑏10) 
2𝑏22(8𝑏11𝑏22 + 𝑏12







2 − 𝑏11𝑏22)𝑏20 
2𝑏22 (8𝑏11𝑏22 + 𝑏12
2
) (𝑏11𝑏22 − 𝑏12
2
)
< 0 
 
